6th Circuit Revives Graduate Counseling Student's Religious Discrimination Claim Against Eastern Michigan University
A unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit ruled on January 27 that District Judge George C. Steeh (E.D. Mich.) should not have granted summary judgment in favor of Eastern Michigan University on a 1st and 14th Amendment free speech/free exercise of religion claim by a graduate student who was expelled from the graduate counseling program after she asked that counseling practicum clients presenting gay relationship issues be referred to other counseling students because of her religious objections to gay relationships. Ward v. Polite, 2011 WL _______ .
Distinguishing this case from the 11th Circuit’s recent decision in Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 2011 WL 6275932 (Dec. 16, 2011), which upheld the denial of a preliminary injunction to a student expelled from a graduate counseling program under somewhat similar circumstances, Circuit Judge Jeffrey Sutton wrote for the 6th Circuit panel that a reasonable jury could conclude, based on the summary judgment record, that Ward was discriminatorily expelled because of her religious beliefs.
In the Keeton case, the plaintiff presented herself as an outspoken critic of homosexuality who would, if given the opportunity, refer gay clients for “conversion therapy” and try to persuade them to abandon the “gay lifestyle,” as the District Court found in that case after a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief to block the expulsion. In this case, by contrast, while stating her personal religiously-based objection to same-sex sexual relationships, Julea Ward requested that a practicum client be assigned to a different counselor so that she would not be in a position to provide counseling that would affirm same-sex relationships. The court pointed out that both the American Counseling Association ethical code, which was cited as a required standard for an accredited program, and textbooks and expert testimony, supported the proposition that professional counselors with strongly held beliefs that might clash with those of their clients can and should refer the clients to other counselors, so that the client would have the benefit of a counselor would could affirm their beliefs and provide helpful counseling services.
Faculty members and administrators dealing with Ward’s case had claimed that the program had a “no-referral policy” in the required practicum; that students were obliged to deal with any client and be able to comply with professional standards of not imposing their own values on the client. But the court found conflicting evidence as to whether the school actually had such a consistent policy, in the light of no evidence of a written policy to that effect, and in the face of the ACA ethical code, which itself supports making referrals to other counselors in such circumstances.
“Ward’s free speech claim deserves to go to a jury,” wrote Judge Sutton. “although the university submits it dismissed Ward from the program because her request for a referral violated the ACA code of ethics, a reasonable jury could find otherwise – that the code of ethics contains no such bar and that the university deployed it as a pretext for punishing Ward’s religious views and speech.” He asked, “What did Ward do wrong? Ward was willing to work with all clients and to respect the school’s affirmation directives in doing so. That is why she asked to refer gay and lesbian clients (and some heterosexual clients) if the conversation required her to affirm their sexual practices. What more could the rule require? Surely, for example, the ban on discrimination against clients based on their religion (1) does not require a Muslim counselor to tell a Jewish client that his religious beliefs are correct if the conversation takes a turn in that direction and (2) does not require an atheist counselor to tell a person of faith that there is a God if the client is wrestling with faith-based issues. Tolerance is a two-way street. Otherwise, the rule mandates orthodoxy, not anti-discrimination.”
Since the ACA code itself allows “values-based referrals,” the court observed that a reasonable jury could conclude that the school’s assertion that it had a “no-referrals” policy was not required by the profession’s ethical standards and, in the absence of any examples of past application of such a policy, a jury could conclude that it was made up ad hoc for the purpose of discriminating against Ward, especially in light of record evidence that various faculty members had made negative comments about her views.
The court noted that the free exercise of religion claim would lead to a similar result as the free speech claim.
However, the court was careful to note that it was not ruling on the merits of the case, just on whether it was appropriate for the trial judge to grant summary judgment when the record consisted solely of affidavits and deposition testimony and there had been no actual hearing. Contrasting this to the Keeton case, Sutton observed, “At one level, the two decisions look like polar opposites, as a student loses one case and wins the other. But there is less tension, or for that matter disagreement, between the two cases than initially meets the eye. The procedural settings of the two cases differ. In Keeton, the district court made preliminary fact findings after holding a hearing in which both sides introduced evidence in support of their claims. Not only are there no trial-level fact findings here, but Ward also gets the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences in challenging the summary-judgment decision entered against her.” By contrast, in a preliminary injunction action, the burden is on the plaintiff to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits of the case, a burden which the 11th Circuit found Ms. Keeton had not met in her case. Judge Sutton also noted differences between Ward, who asked not to be put in the position of having to affirm same-sex relationships with a client, and Keeton, who had made statements that she sought to confront gay clients and urge her values upon them.
The court affirmed the district judge’s decision denying qualified immunity to the individual defendants. Immunity would not extend to Ward’s demand for injunctive relief, just to the demand for money damages, and as to that, the court said, depending how the jury resolved factual disputes, it could find that the university dismissed Ward from the program “because of hostility to her religious speech and beliefs,” and a state actor who proceeds on such a basis does not enjoy immunity from liability. However, the court rejected Ward’s appeal of the district court’s decision to dismiss any claims against the university president and members of its board of trustees, agreeing with the trial judge that there was no evidence that they played any meaningful role in the decision to dismiss Ward. “The problem in this case,” wrote Sutton, “is not a facially unconstitutional policy, as Ward submits, but the potentially improper implementation of that policy by some members of the university and not others. The district court properly accounted for this distinction.”
Ward is represented by the Alliance Defense Fund, an issue-oriented legal organization that frequently appears in cases involving religious freedom claims, especially against gay rights claims. The university is represented by the Michigan Attorney General’s office. Numerous amicus briefs were filed on both sides of the case, including briefs supporting the University from Lambda Legal and the ACLU of Michigan.