Court Martial Appeal Raises Questions About HIV Liability
A military appeals court ruling rejecting an attempt by an HIV-positive male soldier to set aside his guilty plea to charges of aggravated assault for engaging in sex with two women without disclosing his HIV status (and, in the case of one of them, without using a condom) provided the occasion for an interesting debate about what standard to apply in such cases in light of developing knowledge about HIV transmission. The five judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces was unanimous in its May 6 ruling in United States v. Dacus, 2008 Westlaw 1990659, but two of the judges joined in a concurring opinion suggesting some reconsideration should be in order.
Army Staff Sergeant Brandon M. Dacus, a married man, learned that he was HIV-positive in 1996, and received the usual counseling about the need for him to disclose his status to sexual partners and use protection when having sex. According to the medical testimony, he is one of those rare individuals whose immune system suppresses the virus to an undetectable level without any medication. As a result, he is totally asymptomatic and is unlikely ever to develop AIDS.
Military prosecutors charged him with two counts of attempted murder, arising from his adulterous sexual encounters with two women. He used a condom with the first woman, and claimed that he barely penetrated her. With the second, however, he did not use a condom, and had an affair that included at least eleven occasions of sexual intercourse. He didn’t deny the factual allegations, and in the face of drastic penalties if convicted of attempted murder, he agreed to plead guilty to the lesser charges of aggravated assault and adultery, both in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
After his guilty plea, he participated in a sentencing hearing, at which he presented a medical expert, Captain Mark Wallace, a military doctor, who had examined him and reviewed his medical records. Dr. Wallace testified that it was highly unlikely that Dacus could have infected either woman due to his low viral load.
"Dr. Wallace explained that the possibility of transmitting HIV from one person to another is a function of the viral load of the infected individual," wrote Judge Charles Erdmann for the court. "He testified that it was ‘unquestionably’ possible that Dacus could transmit the virus but that the likelihood was ‘extremely low’ due to his low viral load. Dr. Wallace also testified that using a condom would reduce the risk of transmitting the virus even further." He did testify that there were documented cases of low viral load individuals who had sexually transmitted the virus to others, but reiterated that the chances of it happening were "very, very unlikely."
When pushed to quantify his testimony, Wallace said the probability that Dacus could transmit HIV through unprotected sex with a woman was about 1 in 10,000, and that when he used a condom it was 1 in 50,000.
The sentence imposed at court martial is not mentioned in the opinion. Dacus took his case to the Army Court of Appeals, which refused to vacate his guilty plea, and then he appealed further to the Court of Military Appeals.
Dacus’s appeal sought to set aside his guilty plea on the ground that it was inconsistent with the evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing. He pled guilty to aggravated assault. Under military law, this required establishing that "the natural and probable cause of exposing" his sexual partner "to the HIV virus is death or grievous bodily harm," or, put another way, that his conduct was "likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm." Dacus argued that Wallace’s testimony showed that he had not presented such a risk to his female sex partners.
Applying this standard in prior HIV cases, military courts had taken into account both the probability that the virus could be transmitted and the harm that would be caused if it was transmitted. In this case, Judge Erdmann’s opinion focused on whether the testimony about the very slim risk of transmission meant that the statutory standard had not been met.
Erdmann first rejected Dacus’s argument that because of his own low viral load, his sexual partners would not have been seriously harmed had they actually been infected by him. This was not supported by the medical evidence, as Dr. Wallace testified that Dacus’s low viral load was not due to him being infected by a weak strain of the virus, but rather by the extraordinary ability of his immune system to suppress viral replication. Wallace testified that if the women had become infected, unless they also possessed that rare immune system capacity, they would follow the normal course of HIV infection. "So, if a person with a low viral load has infected somebody else," Wallace testified, "anything could happen. They could progress slowly, or very, very rapidly."
However, the other element of risk raised a more serious issue. In past cases, military courts had come to the view that the statutory standard was met if the risk of HIV infection is "more than merely a fanciful, speculative, or remote possibility." "The testimony in the record established that although the risk of transmitting the virus was low and therefore arguably ‘remote,’ the risk was certainly more than fanciful or speculative," wrote Erdmann. After all, Dr. Wallace had testified that "there is no question, he could have transmitted HIV," and Wallace had testified about instances where people with low viral loads had transmitted the virus through intercourse.
This was enough to satisfy the court that Dacus’s guilty plea should not be set aside, but two members of the court, Judges Margaret A. Ryan and James E. Baker, suggested that the issue of risk should be revisited in "an appropriate case."
Writing for herself and Judge Baker, Judge Ryan observed that "the majority succinctly and correctly sums up the extant law," but "this test gives me pause. Common sense seems to dictate that an event is not ‘likely’ for purposes of Article 128(b)(1), UCMJ, regardless of the harm involved, if there is only a 1 in 50,000 chance of that event occurring."
After pointing out that the military precedents do not state that "because the magnitude of the harm from AIDS is great, the risk of harm does not matter," she pointed out that the statutory standard is whether the conduct is "likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm." "Where the floor and ceiling of statistical sufficiency are I do not claim to know," she continued. "But at a minimum I have grave doubts that the statutory element should be deemed satisfied where the statistical probability of the consequence of an act is so low as to approach being no ‘more than merely a fanciful, speculative, or remote possibility.’"
If this was not an appeal from a guilty plea, but rather an appeal from a conviction at trial, Ryan and Baker would be inclined to reconsider whether somebody like Dacus could be convicted of aggravate assault, even where they had not used a condom and had failed to disclose their HIV status.
Ryan and Baker are reflecting an issue that deserves wider discussion in the civilian sphere as well, for many states now apply their criminal law to prosecute HIV-positive individuals who have sex without disclosing their serostatus to their partner. The level of severity of the criminal law is supposed to reflect the magnitude of risk that a defendant presents to the uninfected party, yet the occasional appellate decision that comes to light in such cases suggests that courts have been slow to adapt their rulings to the unfolding evidence about the impact of contemporary medical treatments on reducing viral load to undetectable levels and, consequently, on the actual risk of transmission.