A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, based in Cincinnati, ruled on August 22 in Phelps-Roper v. Strickland, No. 07-3600, that Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec. 3767.30, a statute banning demonstrations within 300 feet of a funeral service or burial ceremony, from one hour before the ceremony to one hour afterwards, does not violate the First Amendment free speech rights of the members of Rev. Fred Phelps’s Kansas-based Westboro Baptist Church, who wish to conduct demonstrations during funerals of U.S. service members killed in Iraq.
Shirley Phelps-Roper, a member of the church who is a relative of Rev. Phelps (as are, apparently, virtually all the church’s members), alleged in her complaint seeking invalidation of the Ohio law that the members of the congregation "believe that homosexuality is a sin and abomination. They further believe that God is punishing America for the sin of homosexuality by killing Americans, including soldiers. Because God is omnipotent to cause or prevent tragedy, they believe that when tragedy strikes it is indicative of God’s wrath."
In order to communicate their beliefs, they have picketed military funerals displaying signs with slogans such as "Thank God for IEDs," "God Hates Fags," "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," and "Thank God for 9/11." They claim that they can only effectively communicate their message through picketing at actual military funerals and burials, and that their right to hold such demonstrations in Ohio has been chilled by fear of prosecution under the statute.
Ohio has had a law banning picketing of funerals since 1957, but it did not define the geographical area within which picketing was prohibited and was thus vulnerable to challenge as being overly broad. In 2006, reacting to recent litigation by the Phelps family challenging such statutes in other states, Ohio amended its statute to create an exact 300 foot buffer zone within which picketing could not take place at funerals, burials, and along the route of funeral processions.
The trial judge decided that creating a moving buffer zone around funeral processions went too far, and quickly granted a motion to invalidate that part of the statute, but granted the state’s motion for summary judgment as to the balance of the statute covering funeral services and burials.
The court of appeals, in an opinion by Judge Richard Fred Suhrheinrich, agreed with the trial court. The court found that the picketing ban was content-neutral, because it banned all picketing or demonstrations, regardless of their point of view. Under established First Amendment precedents, the state may impose "time, place and manner" restrictions on speech if the restrictions are content-neutral, and such restrictions are evaluated for their reasonableness. Such restrictions are upheld if they serve a significant governmental interest, are narrowly tailored to avoid going beyond what is necessary to serve that interest, and leave open "ample channels of communication" for the speaker’s message.
In this case, the court found that the government has a significant interest in protecting funeral attendants from being subjected to unwanted political speech during an emotionally trying time. The court found that by adopting a reasonably specific buffer zone and keeping it in effect only from an hour before to an hour after a funeral, the state had met the narrow tailoring requirement. Because the Phelpses could picket from beyond 300 feet during a funeral, with no statutory restriction on the use of sound equipment, and because they did not have to observe any buffer zones outside of the specified time period, the court found that they had ample opportunity to disseminate their message, taking into account as well that they maintain a website with their message that receives many hits.
The court’s decision upholding the Ohio statute opens up a disagreement with another federal appeals court, the 8th Circuit based in St. Louis, which last year refused in Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 509 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007), to grant summary judgment to the state of Missouri in a similar case brought by Ms Phelps-Roper to challenge that state’s funeral picketing law. The Missouri law is similar to the way the Ohio law was before it was amended in 2006 to adopt a more precise buffer zone. The Missouri law merely specifies "in front of or about any location at which a funeral is held," leaving ambiguity about how far away the pickets have to be to avoid violating the law, and thus arguably failing the "narrow tailoring" requirement.
More importantly, however, the 8th Circuit panel opined that the state’s interest in protecting funeral attendants was probably outweighed by the free speech interests of the Phelpses. The Supreme Court has yet to address this issue in the context of funeral picketing, but it has ruled in past cases that a state could ban picketing in residential areas to protect people from disturbance in their homes, and the 6th Circuit built upon these rulings to find a government interest outside the home at other locations where individuals might have a particular privacy right, such as at a funeral service. The 8th Circuit, by contrast, refused to expand on the Supreme Court’s rulings, pointing out that the Court has not ruled that people have a right outside the home to be shielded from political speech that they might find disturbing or with which they might disagree.
The 8th Circuit disagreed with the contention that the Phelps would still have ample channels to communicate their message, crediting the Phelps’s argument that their message needed to be delivered in the proximity of a funeral service in order to preserve its impact.
These differences of opinion open the possibility that the Supreme Court might grant review in a funeral picketing challenge in order to resolve the question, especially in light of the rash of funeral picketing statutes that have been passed around the country in response to the energetic picketing activities of the Phelpses.