On February 8, I posted here about a decision issued on February 6 by a Mercer County Superior Court Judge, Mary Jacobson, recognizing a same-sex marriage contracted in Canada for the purpose of determining jurisdiction over a divorce petition that had been filed by one of the spouses. I have finally obtained from one of the attorneys in the case a copy of the transcript containing the bench ruling by Judge Jacobson in Hammond v. Hammond, Docket No. FM-11-905-08-B (N.J. Super. Ct., Mercer County, Feb. 6, 2009).
Why was this a bench ruling rather than a written opinion? Judge Jacobson heard argument on this in December 2008 and was working on a decision, but the pressing need for a ruling, due to the parlous physical condition of the plaintiff, persuaded her to deliver a bench ruling, speaking from a prepared outline, on February 6. I suspect that if the state seeks to appeal, Judge Jacobson might accommodate with a more formal written opinion. The bench ruling refers to various cases, but of course the citations are abbreviated in the transcript, and there are the usual misspellings from the court reporter (although the judge went to great pains to make sure they would transcribe one word correctly: "comity" instead of "comedy"!). To help spread information about this decision, I'm going to provide a few key paragraphs here, and I'm going to take the liberty of correcting transcription errors based on my best guess of what was intended.
To provide some context, Lakia Hammond and Kinyati Hammond were married in British Columbia, Canada, then returned to the states. Lakia is now a Mercer County resident. She has a serious medical condition with a poor prognosis. Her married fell apart prior to the move to New Jersey. Her spouse lives in a different state, and has not responded to the divorce petition, although she was served with process. Lakia has a new same-sex partner whom she would like to marry in Canada (New Jersey does not issue licenses to same-sex couples at present), but she needs to have her prior Canadian marriage terminated. After the NJ Civil Union Act was adopted, the NJ Attorney General at that time, Stuart Rabner (now the state's Chief Justice), issued Formal Opinon No. 3-2007, taking the position that same-sex marriages contracted outside the state would be recognized in New Jersey as civil unions. Consistent with that position, the AG's office argues in this case that Lakia may not obtain a divorce from a New Jersey court, only a "dissolution of civil union" as authorized in the Civil Union Act. But she fears that Canadian authorities would not find this sufficient to entitle her to enter into a new marriage in Canada, that only a divorce would do, since she is not party to a civil union, but to a marriage.
Judge Jacobson concludes that Lakia is correct:
"Both sides in this case have cited the seminal New Jersey decision that led to the adoption of the civil union statute and that of course is Lewis v. Harris, 188 N.J. 415, decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in 2006. In that decision, the Court in a majority decision by Justice Albin authorized or directed the legislature to choose either to accord the same rights to same-sex couples as heterosexual couples by authorizing marriage for same-sex couples, or the legislature at its choice could create a parallel statutory structure to convey the same rights and benefits and burdens of marriage on same-sex couples. The legislature chose the latter course, a parallel statutory structure. They enacted the Civil Union statute. Adn the Attorney General's Office has interpreted that statute to require New Jersey to treat same-sex couples whose union has been validated by a government entity, to treat all such union that are similar to civil unions or marriages as civil unions in New Jersey. Following from that, the Attorney General argues then that the plaintiff here with her valid Canadian marriage can only obtain a dissolution of a civil union in New Jersey under the Civil Union statute and may not be granted a final judgment of divorce."
"This Court finds that the position of the Attorney General ignores important rights of comity between sovereigns, in this case international comity between New Jersey and Canada. And I also find that the position undermines New Jersey's well established marriage recognition precedents. And consequently, the Court will issue an order authorizing Ms. Hammond to seek a final judgment of divorce and will schedule a date for a default hearing. I don't believe that allowing Ms. Hammond to obtain a final judgment of divorce in New Jersey undermines the legislative intent in the Civil Union statute. I recognize that Attorney General opinions are entitled to deference, but ultimately, I had to determine whether -- weighing that deference against my analysis particularly of the comity relationship between New Jersey and Canada and the strong, very strong marriage recognition statute and process in New Jersey... And so, I've concluded that the international comity principle is most important here and will cause me to authorize Ms. Hammond to seek a final judgment of divorce."
"Why is comity so important here? New Jersey has long recognized that a marriage valid under the laws of the country or state where the marriage takes place is valid in this state as long as the marriage is not void as against public policy, such as if a marriage was based on polygamy, or incest, or between close relatives, or involved somebody who was underage. Where there's a strong public policy, if you're married in another jurisdiction, that won't be accepted here. But, virtually all other marriages are accepted here as long as they are valid under the laws of the country or state where the marriage takes place. And there are a number of opinions in New Jersey that recognize this important principle. One of them is McMorrow v. Schweiker, 561 F. Supp. 584 (D.N.J. 1982), and there are a number of other cases that reiterate this: Bucca v. State of New Jersey, 43 N.J. Super. 322 (Ch. Div. 1957), Innes v. Carrascosa, 391 N.J. Super. 453 (2007). And one of the earlier cases that was cited was that of Smith v. Smith, 52 NJL 207 (1889)...."
"So this has been the established law not only in New Jersey, but it's essentially a basis for family law throughout the country. And of course the same principle has been incorporated into the Restatement (2nd) of Conflicts of Law, as reflected in Section 283, comment B, that recognizes the importance of comity and to promote justice to individuals and to produce friendly intercourse between the sovereignties to which they belong. And I also wanted to note Restatement (2nd) of Conflicts of Law, Section 283, which specifically says, 'A marriage which satisfies the requirements of teh state where the marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of the marriage.' It's the fact that that's been the rule for so long, it's just ingrained in how we practice in family court, day in and day out, that it one of the things that was so persuasive to me in reviewing the issues in this case. That marriage recognition principle is, as I said, an underpinning of the family court day in and day out. Every week here in Mercer County we have approximately 20 to 25 divorces. And many of them are based upon marriages that were done in other jurisdictions, and often in other countries. So, the principles of comity underline what we don on a daily basis and are extremely important."
"When people come to get divorced in a typical family court proceeding, obviously when you come with a marriage, a valid marriage, you leave with a divorce. If you come with a civil union, you leave with a dissolution of a civil union. And here, we have Lakia Hammond coming with a valid Canadian marriage and the State suggests that she can only leave with a dissolution of a civil union. . . we have Lakia Hammond coming to New Jersey which has a civil union statute but does not issue marriage licenses for same-sex couples. And she's seeking a divorce for her Canadian marriage. And so it seems to me that what she needs, having a valid marriage, is a divorce or, as anyone coming with a civil union before the Court would get a dissolution of a civil uion, and that the essence of comity is to recognize that other states and other countries have different laws governing things as important to society as marriage and that we give full faith and credit to their laws as long as there is no good reason not to."
Judge Jacobson notes that N.J., unlike other jurisdictions, has not adopted a version of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, so there is no formal statutory proscription on recognizing a foreign same-sex marriage in New Jersey, leading her to conclude that "to grant the divorce here is not against public policy. It's consistent with the strong marriage recognition principles that have been recognized by the New Jersey courts since the 1800s that are the underpinnings for the practice day in and day out in New Jersey Courts issuing divorces and recognizing marriages that are valid elsewhere." She also noted that the legislature did not specifically address this issue in the Civil Union Act, "so I don't see how granting a divorce here is inconsistent with the legislature's intent because the legislature did not address the specific issue and the legislature did not adopt the Defense of Marriage Act."
Judge Jacobson also took note of the NY case of Martinez v. County of Monroe as providing analogous reasoning.
She did emphasize the narrowness of her ruling: "And so I think to recognize the Canadian marriage is valid to the extent of saying it should be ended by granting a divorce, which is all that I'm saying here. I think it recognizes Canada's law and their right to make decisions about important issues such as marriage. But, I don't believe it does anything to undercut the different policy judgment made by the New Jersey legislature. I'm also concerned here that if the plaintiff wants to remarry in Canada that the way her union with Kinyati Hammond is ended has impact outside the State of New Jersey. She says in her certification, and I accept it as true, it's undisputed that she plans to return to Canada to be remarried. And if she goes with a document that says dissolution of a civil union and what she had was a valid marriage in Canada, I think she has a valid concern that there could be issues raised in Canada."
"I just want to note that this is a very narrow decision based upon the principles of comity. And comity is not a mandatory doctrine, but is one that has strong policy reasons itself that have been recognized by the New Jersey Courts in many cases, one which is Sensient Colors, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 373 (2008). And in this world, where people move around from one place to another frequently, I think comity is very important in this area, and serves not only the plaintiff here well, but also any governmental entity that she will come in contact with as she moves on from here, once she continues to seek the ending of her legal relationship with Kinyati Hammond."
The judge also thanked the parties for the "excellent legal materials" that they submitted. So I will close this posting with a list of the attorneys who appeared in the case: For the plaintiff: Stephen Hyland, Ed Barocas (ACLU), and Lawrence Lustberg. For the AG, Melissa Raksa.